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I. INTRODUCTION 
The combination of the increased number of underwater 
mortgages1 and the increased number of bankruptcy filings2 has cre-
ated at least one new issue in bankruptcy law: can a debtor avoid lia-
bility on a lien that was fully secured by collateral in his home at the 
outset of the loan, if a subsequent decrease in the value of the collat-
eral (i.e. his home) has caused the lien to become less than fully se-
cured at the time of the bankruptcy filing?  This question can arise in 
two contexts, each of which follows its own analysis: (1) an attempt 
to “strip down” the amount of debt owed on a loan to match the cur-
rent value of the collateral; or (2) an attempt to “strip off” a loan in its 
entirety, when there is no remaining value on the collateral.  Addi-
tionally, the analysis varies based on the Chapter of the Bankruptcy 
Code used for the proceeding. 
Individuals filing for bankruptcy typically utilize either Chap-
ter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).3  The Su-
preme Court has clearly prohibited stripping down a mortgage in both 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings,4 but has remained silent as to 
stripping off a mortgage in either Chapter.  So far, the Circuit Courts 
have agreed that a Chapter 13 debtor may strip off a wholly unse-
 
1 Les Christie, More Than 30% of Mortgage Borrowers Still Underwater, CNN MONEY 
(May 24, 2012, 5:23AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/24/real_estate/underwater-
mortgages/index.htm (indicating that nearly one-third of borrowers owe more money on 
their mortgage than their home is worth). 
2 Compare Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy 
Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, U.S. BANKR. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/12
12_f2.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 Bankruptcy Report] (indicating that 
approximately 1.2 million bankruptcy proceedings were filed in the federal courts of the 
United States in 2012), with Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, By 
Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve Month Period Ended Dec. 31, 2007, 
U.S. BANKR. COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/Bankruptcy 
Filings/2007/1207_f2.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (indicating that approximately 850,000 
bankruptcy proceedings were filed in 2007). 
3 2012 Bankruptcy Report, supra note 2 (noting that of the total number of bankruptcy 
filings in 2012, 843,545 were filed under Chapter 7, while 366,532 were filed under Chapter 
13; therefore 99% of all bankruptcy proceedings during 2012 were filed under either Chapter 
7 or Chapter 13). 
4 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor cannot 
strip down a partially unsecured mortgage); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 
325-26 (1993) (holding that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot strip down a partially undersecured 
mortgage). 
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cured junior mortgage;5 however, a recent ruling in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit created a split as to the issue of whether a Chapter 7 debtor may 
strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.6 
This Comment discusses the nuances of underwater mortgag-
es and bankruptcy proceedings.  Part II provides an overview of the 
common types of bankruptcy and the basic terminology related to the 
concepts discussed in this Comment.  Part III summarizes the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the Code as applied to stripping down 
of primary mortgages in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings.  
Part IV discusses how the Circuit Courts have applied the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence to the related concept of stripping off in Chap-
ter 7 proceedings.  Part IV ultimately concludes that the minority rule 
allowing stripping off in Chapter 7 proceedings is the correct view 
based on the plain text of the Code.  Part V describes how the Circuit 
Courts have applied the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence described in 
Part III to the related concept of stripping off in Chapter 13 proceed-
ings in order to universally hold that stripping off in Chapter 13 is al-
lowed.  Finally, Part VI briefly discusses the conclusions reached in 





5 See First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221, 224 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d sub nom In 
re Johnson, 407 Fed. Appx. 713 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished, per curium); Lane v. W. Inter-
state Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2002); Zimmer v. PSB Lending 
Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty 
(In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 
217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 
F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 
F.3d 277, 296 (5th Cir. 2000); Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 187 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2011); Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) 
(all holding that a Chapter 13 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage dur-
ing a bankruptcy proceeding). 
6 Compare McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562, 564-65 
(11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off a whol-
ly unsecured junior mortgage), with, e.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 
778, 783 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor may not strip off a wholly unse-
cured junior mortgage). 
4
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II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY LAW 
A. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Filings in the Wake of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 
Individuals who file for bankruptcy typically do so under ei-
ther Chapter 7 (“Liquidation Bankruptcy”) or Chapter 13 (“Individual 
Debt Adjustment”) of the Code.7  The Chapter 13 debtor must create 
a “reorganization plan,” which aims to pay off debts with future earn-
ings.8  The debtor must comply with the reorganization plan, attend 
educational courses, and fulfill other requirements in order to obtain 
discharge of his debt.9 
The Chapter 13 debtor must pay back varying degrees of his 
debt based on the categorization of the creditor’s claim as priority, 
secured or unsecured.10  “Priority claims are those granted special sta-
tus by the bankruptcy law, such as most taxes and the costs of bank-
ruptcy proceedings.”11  These claims must be paid in full, unless the 
creditor agrees to accept less than full payment.12  Secured claims are 
those which are secured by collateral in real property.13  “If the debtor 
wants to keep the collateral securing a particular claim, then the plan 
must provide that the holder of the secured claim receive at least the 
value of the collateral,” or, in some cases, “full payment of the 
 
7 2012 Bankruptcy Report, supra note 2 (99% of all bankruptcy filings during 2012 were 
filed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13); see also Bankruptcy Basics, Chapter 7: Liquida-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/ 
BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Chapter 7 Basics] 
(describing Chapter 7 bankruptcy as liquidation); Bankruptcy Basics, Chapter 13: Individual 
Debt Adjustment, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/ 
Chapter13.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Chapter 13 Basics] (describing 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy as individual debt adjustment). 
8 Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. IV 2010) (describing the types of claims that are 
entitled to priority). 
12 Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) 
(“The plan . . . shall provide for the full payment . . . of all claims entitled to priority [sta-
tus] . . . unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such 
claim.”). 
13 Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7. 
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debt.”14  Unsecured claims are those which are not priority claims 
and which are not secured by any particular interest in the debtor’s 
property.15  Unsecured claims do not need to be paid back in full as 
long as the “debtor will pay all projected ‘disposable income’ over an 
‘applicable commitment period,’ and as long as unsecured creditors 
receive at least as much under the plan as they would receive if the 
debtor’s assets were liquidated under Chapter 7.”16  If the debtor 
complies with all of his obligations throughout the reorganization pe-
riod, the debtor will receive a discharge from “all debts provided for 
by the plan.”17 
Conversely, a Chapter 7 debtor must place all of her non-
exempt property into the hands of a bankruptcy trustee.18  The trustee 
liquidates the debtor’s property and distributes the proceeds to credi-
tors in a certain order of priority based on the type of each claim 
held.19  Creditors who hold priority claims are paid first and the re-
maining funds are then distributed through the other classes of 
claims; the last person paid is the debtor herself.20  The Chapter 7 
debtor’s concerns typically center on “retain[ing] exempt property 
and receiv[ing] a discharge that covers as many debts as possible” 
because the debtor will not receive any distribution from the liquida-
tion unless and until all other classes of claims have been fully re-
paid.21 
In 2005, “Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) to correct per-
ceived abuses to the bankruptcy system.”22  Congress wanted to en-




16 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2010) (“[T]he court shall confirm a plan 
if . . . the value . . . of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed 
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of 
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . .”). 
17 Chapter 13 Basics, supra note 7. 
18 Chapter 7 Basics, supra note 7. 
19 Id. (“Under § 726 of [the Code], there are six classes of claims; and each class must be 
paid in full before the next lower class is paid anything.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) 
(Supp. IV 2010) (describing the six classes of claims and the order of priority for distribution 
in liquidation bankruptcy). 
20 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). 
21 Chapter 7 Basics, supra note 7. 
22 Mark A. Redmiles, The Supreme Court Interprets the Means Test, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
18 (Apr. 2011). 
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sort” to receive a fresh start from “severe financial distress,” could 
file for bankruptcy, and prevent use of the system as “a head start for 
individuals who could repay some or all of their debts but preferred 
not to.”23  Additionally, portions of the BAPCPA were designed to 
limit the availability of Chapter 7 bankruptcy in order to prevent 
debtors from using Chapter 7 to clear debts which they could afford 
to repay through a Chapter 13 plan.24  However, in 2012, Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filings were filed at more than double the rate of Chapter 
13 filings.25  Thus, Chapter 7 remains the most common mechanism 
for an individual to file for bankruptcy. 
B. Stripping Off and Stripping Down 
Historically, a creditor who held a debt secured by collateral 
in the debtor’s primary residence had a relatively safe investment be-
cause home values were typically expected to rise.26  As long as the 
value of the collateral (the home) remained greater than the debt 
owed, the debt remained fully secured by the value of the home.  
However, as housing prices took a plunge in recent years, some home 
mortgages became unsecured when the value of the home dropped to 
an amount less than the amount owed on the mortgage.27  Consider, 
for example, a buyer who purchased a home valued at $200,000 by 
taking a primary mortgage in the amount of $180,000 and a second-
ary mortgage in the amount of $20,000.  Both mortgages were fully 
secured by the value of the home at the time the home was purchased 
and the mortgages were created.  Assume that shortly after the pur-
chase, the buyer filed for bankruptcy before having owned the home 
for enough time to make any significant contribution to the principal 
of the mortgage.  If the real estate market had fluctuated such that, at 
the time of filing for bankruptcy, the buyer’s home was only valued 
 
23 Id. 
24 Jeanne Sahadi, The New Bankruptcy Law and You, CNN MONEY (Oct. 17 2005, 12:17 
PM) http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/17/pf/debt/bankruptcy_law/index.htm. 
25 2012 Bankruptcy Report, supra note 2. 
26 See, e.g., GILLETTE EDMUNDS & JIM KEENE, RETIRE ON THE HOUSE: USING REAL ESTATE 
TO SECURE YOUR RETIREMENT 1 (2006) (discussing an optimistic view of the real estate 
market, one in which one can possibly expect to retire on home equity alone). 
27 Jake Miller, Issue Brief: Housing, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505103_162-57523544/issue-brief-housing/ (describing the 
steady decline in home values in recent years, stating that “[i]n 2008, the bottom fell out, and 
housing prices plunged nationwide”). 
7
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at $160,000, then at the time of the bankruptcy filing the amount 
owed on the primary mortgage alone exceeded the total value of the 
home.  Furthermore, there would be no collateral left to secure any 
portion of the secondary mortgage.  Therefore, at the time of the 
bankruptcy filing, the primary mortgage would be considered partial-
ly unsecured, while the secondary mortgage would be considered 
wholly unsecured. 
The phenomenon discussed above has created the bankruptcy 
concepts of “stripping off” and “stripping down.”  Stripping down re-
fers to the debtor’s attempt to void the unsecured portion of a partial-
ly unsecured debt.28  In the above example, the debtor would try to 
strip down his primary mortgage from $180,000 to $160,000 because, 
at the time of bankruptcy filing, the collateral was only valued at 
$160,000.  Stripping off refers to voiding a debt (usually a junior lien) 
that is wholly unsecured at the time of bankruptcy filing.29  In the 
above example, the debtor would attempt to strip off the secondary 
mortgage in its entirety, because the amount owed on the primary 
mortgage alone ($180,000) exceeds the entire value of the collateral 
($160,000), leaving no collateral to secure any portion of the second-
ary mortgage. 
The Supreme Court has disallowed the practice of stripping 
down in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings,30 
but has remained silent as to the practice of stripping off in both types 
of proceedings.  Until recently, the few circuit courts that ruled on the 
issue held that a Chapter 7 debtor may not strip off a wholly unse-
cured junior mortgage.31  However, the Eleventh Circuit recently 
 
28 See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 412 (1992) (discussing a debtor’s attempt to 
“strip down” a lien when the value of the collateral was less than the amount of the creditor’s 
claim). 
29 See, e.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing a debtor’s attempt to “strip off” a junior lien when the primary mortgage exceeded 
the value of the home). 
30 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor cannot strip down the value 
of an outstanding mortgage debt to match the value of the underlying collateral); Nobelman 
v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1993) (holding that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot 
strip down the value of a mortgage debt to match the value of the underlying collateral). 
31 Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e 
hold that a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 506 to ‘strip off’ an allowed junior lien where the 
senior lien exceeds the fair market value of the real property in question.”); Ryan, 253 F.3d 
at 779 (“[W]e hold that a debtor  may not strip off an unsecured but allowed lien pursuant to 
Section 506(d).”); Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 876 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“Section 506 was intended to facilitate valuation and disposition of 
8
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broke ranks and created the minority view, being the first Circuit to 
hold that it is permissible to strip off a wholly unsecured junior mort-
gage during a Chapter 7 proceeding.32  Courts have reached the exact 
opposite conclusion with respect to Chapter 13 proceedings, with a 
distinct majority of courts holding that a wholly unsecured junior 
mortgage can be stripped off during a Chapter 13 proceeding.33  The 
reasons for the difference in treatment of unsecured junior mortgages 
in each Chapter will be discussed in Parts IV and V infra. 
III. STRIPPING DOWN AND THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Chapter 7: Dewsnup v. Timm34 
In the early 1990s, a split developed in the circuit courts as to 
whether a primary mortgage could be stripped down to the value of 
the underlying collateral in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.35  In 
1992, the Supreme Court settled this issue in the case Dewsnup v. 
Timm.36  In Dewsnup, Chapter 7 debtors had an outstanding debt of 
approximately $120,000—an amount which exceeded the fair market 
 
property in the reorganization chapters of the Code, not to confer an additional avoiding 
power on a Chapter 7 debtor.”). 
32 McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562, 564-65 (11th Cir. 
2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off a wholly unse-
cured junior mortgage). 
33 See First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221, 224 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d sub nom 
First Mariner Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 407 Fed. App’x 713 (4th Cir. 2011) (un-
published, per curium); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 
2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); Tan-
ner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. 
Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony 
Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 296 (5th Cir. 2000); Fisette v. Keller (In re 
Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 187 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 
249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (all holding that a Chapter 13 debtor could strip off 
a wholly unsecured junior mortgage during a bankruptcy proceeding). 
34 502 U.S. 410. 
35 Compare, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(prohibiting strip down in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding), aff’d sub nom. Dewsnup v. 
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, with, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 
1308 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing strip down in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding) abrogated 
by Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410. 
36 502 U.S. 410. 
9
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value of the property acting as collateral on the loan.37  The debtors 
argued that because the amount of the lien exceeded the value of the 
collateral, the lien should be reduced such that the outstanding debt 
would equal the fair market value of the land.38  The Court stated the 
issue as whether “a debtor [may] ‘strip down’ a creditor’s lien on real 
property to the value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when 
that value is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien?”39  
The Court held that stripping down under these circumstances was 
not permissible, based on the plain text of the statute and supported 
by legislative intent.40 
1. Statutory Interpretation 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Dewsnup, Chapter 7 
debtors relied on the interplay between § 506(a) and § 506(d) in order 
to justify stripping down of an undersecured mortgage.41  Section 
506(a) allows a debtor to bifurcate a lien into secured and unsecured 
components,42 while section 506(d) allows a debtor to void most 
claims that are not “allowed secured claims.”43  Therefore, pre-
Dewsnup debtors argued that the plain text of § 506(a) allowed a 
debtor to split his mortgage lien into secured and unsecured compo-
nents and § 506(d) allowed the debtor to void the unsecured por-
tion.44  This plain text argument was rejected by the Court.45 
In Dewsnup, the debtors carefully crafted their argument in 
favor of stripping down by reading § 506(a) and (d) of the bankruptcy 
 
37 Id. at 413. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 412. 
40 Id. at 417. 
41 E.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1306 (3d Cir. 1989), ab-
rogated by Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410. 
42 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on proper-
ty in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount sub-
ject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of 
such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such al-
lowed claim.”). 
43 Id. § 506(d) (“To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an 
allowed secured claim, such lien is void . . . .”). 
44 E.g., Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1306. 
45 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410. 
10
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code as complementary provisions.46  The debtors argued that § 
506(a) could be used to bifurcate allowed claims into secured and un-
secured claims; then § 506(d) could be used to void any claim which 
was not an allowed, secured claim under § 506(a).47  On the other 
hand, the creditor argued that within § 506(d), “the words [allowed 
and secured] should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is 
first, allowed, and second secured.”48  Therefore, the creditor con-
cluded that § 506(d) could not be used to void any amount of the lien, 
because the lien itself was, “ ‘allowed’ pursuant to §502 of the Code 
and [was] secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying collat-
eral . . . .”49 
The Court adopted the interpretation of the creditor, reasoning 
that “§ 506(d) does not allow [debtors] to ‘strip down’ [a creditor’s] 
lien, because [a creditor’s] claim is secured by a lien and has been 
fully allowed pursuant to § 502.”50  The Court observed that the statu-
tory text is ambiguous on this point, but looked to legislative intent to 
adopt the interpretation that § 506(a) should be read separately from 
§ 506(d).51  The Court favored the creditor’s interpretation of the am-
biguity, as this interpretation was most consistent with pre-Code 
treatment of these types of liens.52 
2. Legislative Intent 
The creditor argued that prior to the enactment of the present-
day versions of § 506(a) and (d), liens of the type in question passed 
through bankruptcy unaffected; therefore, absent clear legislative in-
tent to the contrary, this long-standing practice should not be dis-
turbed.53  The Court agreed with this argument, pointing to earlier ju-
risprudence of the Court indicating that a bankruptcy discharge 
destroys only in personam liability against the debtor, while leaving 
 
46 Brief for Petitioner at *14 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741); see 
also 11 U.S.C. § 506. 
47 Brief for Petitioner at *14 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741). 
48 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 417. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Brief for Respondent at *27 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741). 
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in rem liability intact.54  The Court seemingly adopted the creditor’s 
observation that “there [was] nothing in the Code’s legislative history 
that reflect[ed] any intent to alter that law.”55  The ambiguity in the 
text itself, combined with the lack of language within the legislative 
history indicating intent to depart from the pre-Code treatment of the-
se types of liens, caused the Court to conclude that it was “not con-
vinced that Congress intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that 
liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.”56 
3. Implications for Similar Scenarios 
While the Dewsnup court was clear in its holding with respect 
to an undersecured primary mortgage in a Chapter 7 proceeding, it is 
difficult to determine the breadth of its holding with respect to simi-
lar, but not identical, fact situations.  The Court carefully limited its 
holding to the case before it, expressly stating that: 
Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those 
advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of 
interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would 
apply to all possible fact situations.  We therefore fo-
cus upon the case before us and allow other facts to 
await their legal resolution on another day.57 
These two sentences provide significant support for the mi-
nority of courts that have held that Dewsnup does not apply to the 
similar, but not identical, issue of stripping off a wholly unsecured 
junior mortgage.58  The Court was careful to expressly limit the hold-
ing to a very specific fact pattern; the express language of the opinion 
indicates that courts need not overturn other contrary rules in similar 
situations based on the Dewsnup holding.59  Nonetheless, a majority 
of courts have found Dewsnup to be controlling precedent when 
 
54 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418 (discussing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 
(1991)). 
55 Id. at 416. 
56 Id. at 417. 
57 Id. at 416-17. 
58 E.g., In re Lavelle, No. 09-72389-478, 2009 WL 4043089 at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 
19, 2009) (quoting above two sentences from Dewsnup in reaching the conclusion that 
Dewsnup is not controlling in similar, but not identical, factual situations such as stripping 
off), overruled by Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
59 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17. 
12
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faced with the issue of stripping off a wholly unsecured junior mort-
gage, as discussed in Part IV.A. infra. 
B. Chapter 13: Nobelman v. American Savings Bank60 
When filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Code, the 
debtor must create a reorganization plan with the goal of repayment 
of certain debts with “future earnings or other future income.”61  Sec-
tion 1322(b) of the Code describes the parameters of a reorganization 
plan and provides that the debtor’s plan may “modify the rights of 
holders of secured claims.”62  Therefore, the issue of stripping down 
an undersecured mortgage, follows an entirely different analysis in a 
Chapter 13 case than in a Chapter 7 case, because § 1322 is available 
as a mechanism to modify the rights of certain secured creditors for 
Chapter 13 debtors but not for Chapter 7 debtors.63 
Section 1322(b)(2) sets out a general rule that the rights of se-
cured creditors may be modified as part of a debt reorganization 
plan.64  However, immediately following this rule is the 
antimodification exception, which prohibits modifications of rights of 
claimants who hold a debt secured only by the debtor’s primary resi-
dence.65  The question in a Chapter 13 proceeding, therefore, is not 
only whether the claim is an “allowed secured claim” under § 506, 
but also whether such a claim falls within the antimodification excep-
tion stated in § 1322(b)(2).66 
In Nobelman, the facts were similar to Dewsnup; however in 
Nobelman, the debtors filed their petition under Chapter 13 and re-
quested stripping down of the mortgage as part of a reorganization 
plan created pursuant to § 1322,67 while in Dewsnup, the debtors had 
filed their petition under Chapter 7 and requested stripping down of 
 
60 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
61 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2010). 
62 Id. § 1322(b)(2). 
63 Compare, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 411-13 (determining whether § 506 allows strip 
down in Chapter 7 proceeding), with, e.g., Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 325-26 (determining 
whether § 1322 allows strip down in Chapter 13 proceedings). 
64 11. U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). 
65 Id. 
66 E.g., Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (finding that debtor could not strip down mortgage be-
cause antimodification exception applied). 
67 Id. at 326. 
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the mortgage pursuant to § 506(d).68  In Nobelman, the debtors ar-
gued that the antimodification protection of 1322(b)(2) applied “only 
to the extent the mortgagee holds a ‘secured claim’ in the debtor’s 
residence and that [the court] must first look to § 506(a) to determine 
the value of the mortgagee’s ‘secured claim.’ ”69  The debtors further 
argued that “[u]nder this view, the bank is the holder of a ‘secured 
claim’ only in the amount of . . . the value of the collateral proper-
ty.”70  Therefore, the debtors concluded that § 1322(b)(2) should al-
low a debtor to strip down an undersecured mortgage in a Chapter 13 
proceeding.71 
The Court disagreed with the debtors’ arguments, and instead 
determined that § 1322 did not allow a debtor to strip down an 
undersecured mortgage.72  The Court focused heavily on the precise 
terminology used in the statute, and noted that § 1322 speaks to mod-
ification of “rights” of the creditor, rather than modification of 
“claims” of the creditor.73  Absent a definition of the term “rights” in 
the Code, the Court determined that “Congress ha[d] ‘left the deter-
mination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state 
law,’ since such ‘[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state 
law.’ ”74  The rights of the mortgagee, therefore, were deemed to be 
those rights set out in the mortgage instrument, which, as the Court 
noted, typically include “the right to repayment of the principal in 
monthly installments over a fixed term at specified adjustable rates of 
interest . . . .”75  Therefore, in Nobelman, the creditor’s rights were 
protected by the antimodification exception, because the creditor still 
held a claim secured by collateral in the debtors’ primary residence, 
regardless of the fact that the value of the collateral was less than the 
amount of the creditor’s claim.76  The Court concluded that stripping 
down was not allowed, because modification of the amount of the 
 
68 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 411-412, 413. 
69 Nobelman, 502 U.S. at 328. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 332. 
73 Id. at 328. 
74 Nobelman, 502 U.S. at 329 (second alteration in original) (quoting Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)). 
75 Id. (“These are the rights that were ‘bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee,’ 
and are rights protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2).”). 
76 Id. at 331. 
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mortgage principal would be a modification of a right of a creditor 
holding a claim secured by an interest in the debtors’ principal resi-
dence—precisely the type of modification disallowed by § 
1322(b)(2).77 
Although the majority focused purely on the language of § 
1322 in reaching its holding, Justice Stevens discussed the policy 
supporting the majority opinion in his concurring opinion.78  Stevens 
questioned why Congress would provide more protection for a mort-
gagee holding a lien secured by collateral in a debtor’s primary resi-
dence than for any other creditor holding a lien secured by collateral 
in other real or personal property.79  Stevens noted that Congress like-
ly provided more protection to mortgagees of primary residences in 
order to “encourage the flow of capital into the home lending mar-
ket.”80 
Therefore, Nobelman provides two major rationales for pro-
hibiting stripping down of a mortgage on a debtor’s primary resi-
dence in a Chapter 13 proceeding.  First, the plain text of § 1322 
speaks to protection of creditor’s “rights” as to a claim secured by a 
debtor’s primary mortgage.81  Modification of the amount of the prin-
cipal is a modification of the “right” of the creditor and therefore is 
prohibited by the antimodificaiton exception at § 1322(b)(2).82  Se-
cond, Congress intended to protect mortgagees from modification 
under Chapter 13 in order to encourage more lending in the residen-
tial real estate market.83  The result of Nobelman is that the 
antimodification exception found within § 1322(b)(2) prohibits a 
debtor from modifying the rights of a creditor with respect to a lien 
that is partially or wholly secured by the debtor’s primary residence.84 
 
77 Id. (noting that the terms of the mortgage instrument include the amount of the princi-
pal, the term of the loan, the interest rate and the monthly payment, and that modification of 
any of these terms would be an impermissible modification of creditor’s rights). 
78 Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
79 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 328 (majority opinion). 
82 Id. at 332. 
83 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
84 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (majority opinion). 
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C. Conclusions of Dewsnup and Nobelman 
The Supreme Court has, therefore, banned the practice of 
stripping down undersecured mortgages in both Chapter 7 and Chap-
ter 13 proceedings.85  This means that if there is any amount of value 
in the home that is acting as collateral for the mortgage, even just one 
penny, the mortgage may not be stripped down to match the value of 
the home.  In order to reach this conclusion, the Court’s primary con-
sideration was the precise textual meaning of the applicable statutes 
within the Code.86  The Court also turned to legislative intent to aid in 
its interpretation and to provide support for its plain text conclu-
sions.87  These same principles of interpretation will be applied to the 
related concept of mortgage strip off in Parts IV and V infra. 
IV. STRIPPING OFF AND CHAPTER 7 
A. Majority View: Stripping Off Is Not Allowed 
Courts have struggled to determine whether Dewsnup applies 
in full force when a debtor attempts to strip off a junior lien that has 
become wholly unsecured by virtue of depreciation of the value of 
the home.88  In such cases, the debtor’s residence is typically subject 
to two liens: (1) a primary mortgage which, by itself, exceeds the 
value of the home; and (2) a secondary mortgage (the junior lien), for 
which there is no remaining value on the home to act as collateral 
once the primary mortgage is satisfied.89  While courts are split, a dis-
tinct majority of courts have found that Dewsnup prohibits stripping 
 
85 Id. at 325-26 (holding that §1322(b)(2) disallows strip down of a mortgage in Chapter 
13 proceeding); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (disallowing strip down of a 
mortgage in Chapter 7 proceeding). 
86 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 328 (focusing on the use of the term “rights” in the plain text of 
the statute); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415, 417 (concluding that “the better of the several ap-
proaches” to interpretation involves reading each term in the statute separately). 
87 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reconciling plain text interpreta-
tion with legislative intent to increase flow of lending into home market); Dewsnup, 502 
U.S. at 417 (considering Congressional intent in light of historical treatment of similar liens). 
88 See generally, e.g., Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (court considers application of Dewsnup when Chapter 7 debtor seeks 
to strip off wholly unsecured junior lien). 
89 E.g., id. at 873 (debtors’ residence subject to two mortgages, the primary mortgage 
alone exceeds the value of the home). 
16
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off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage, just as it prohibits stripping 
down a partially unsecured primary mortgage.90 
1. Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel: 
Laskin v. First National Bank of Keystone 
(In re Laskin)91 
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel92 was the first 
post-Dewsnup appellate court to interpret § 506(d) in the context of 
stripping off a lien attached to real property.93  In Laskin, the debtors 
held property that was subject to two liens: (1) an undersecured pri-
mary mortgage; and (2) a wholly unsecured junior lien.94  The debt-
ors sought to strip off the wholly unsecured junior lien during their 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.95 
In order to escape Dewsnup’s prohibition on lien stripping, 
the debtors argued that their lien was entirely unlike the lien at issue 
in Dewsnup because their lien was wholly, rather than partially, unse-
cured at the time of the bankruptcy filing.96  The debtors reasoned 
that the Dewsnup holding was a narrow holding; one that applied on-
ly to a debtor’s attempt to strip down a partially secured lien.97  The 
debtors concluded that the Dewsnup holding, therefore, had no bear-
ing on their attempt to strip off their junior mortgage, because their 
 
90 E.g., Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“Because the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . applies with equal force and logic 
to the issue at hand, we hold that a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 506 to ‘strip off’ an al-
lowed junior lien . . . .”); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 
2001) (“Because we find that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . is equally ap-
plicable to ‘strip offs’ as to ‘strip downs’, [sic] we hold that a debtor may not strip off an un-
secured but allowed lien . . . .”); Laskin, 222 B.R. at 875 (“[W]e conclude that Dewsnup nev-
ertheless bars the relief debtors seek.”). 
91 222 B.R. 872. 
92 To date, five circuits have established Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs) which are 
“unit[s] of the federal courts of appeals” having jurisdiction over “[a]ppeals from dispositive 
orders of bankruptcy judges . . . with further appeal as of right to the court of appeals for the 
circuit.”  Courts of Appeals: Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofAppeals/Ba
nkruptcyAppellatePanels.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
93 Laskin, 222 B.R. 872. 
94 Id. at 873. 
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junior mortgage was wholly unsecured.98  Instead, the debtors equat-
ed their case with numerous other cases where a debtor sought to 
strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.99  The debtors cited 
numerous cases in which other courts had allowed a Chapter 13 
debtor to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien, and urged the court 
to adopt the view of these courts in their Chapter 7 proceeding.100  
However, this argument was fatally flawed because of the debtors’ 
exclusive reliance on Chapter 13 cases for support.101  These cases 
were easily distinguished because in each Chapter 13 case the strip 
off had been allowed pursuant to § 1322(b)(2)—a provision of the 
Code which does not apply to a Chapter 7 debtor.102  Therefore, the 
debtors had failed to provide any legal support for their contention 
that a debtor should be allowed to strip off a wholly unsecured junior 
lien during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.103 
Additionally, the court noted (although the debtors had ne-
glected to) that there were at least two post-Dewsnup bankruptcy 
courts that had allowed a Chapter 7 debtor to strip off a wholly unse-
cured junior lien.104  However, the court declined to follow these 
courts, reasoning that the analysis used by these courts, “reverse[d] 
the statutory process,” as § 506(d) could not, by itself, void a lien 
which was otherwise allowed and secured.105  The court found that 
the same three policy rationales that provided support for Dewsnup’s 
prohibition on stripping down similarly provided support for a prohi-
bition on stripping off: (1) consistency with the historical practice of 
allowing these types of liens to pass through bankruptcy unaffected; 
(2) respect for the agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee 
which allows the lien to remain with the property until foreclosure; 
and (3) prevention of a windfall for the debtor by allowing any in-
crease in the value of the property prior to the time of foreclosure to 
accrue in the favor of the creditor.106  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the debtors could not strip off their junior lien because Dewsnup 
 





103 Laskin, 222 B.R. at 873 (affirming denial of debtors’ motion for lack of case law). 
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prevented a debtor from stripping down or off any lien attached to the 
debtor’s residence, regardless of whether the lien was partially or 
wholly unsecured.107 
2. Fourth Circuit: Ryan v. Homecomings 
Financial Network108 
In Ryan, the debtors sought to strip off a wholly unsecured 
junior mortgage during their Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.109  
The debtors argued that Dewsnup did not prevent them from stripping 
off their unsecured junior lien because Dewsnup prohibited the prac-
tice of lien stripping only where the lien in question was at least par-
tially secured by equity in the debtor’s residence.110  Alternatively, 
the debtors argued that Nobelman provided support for their conten-
tion that a wholly unsecured junior lien could be stripped off during a 
Chapter 7 proceeding.111 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with both of the debtors’ argu-
ments.112  First, the court determined that Dewsnup was indistin-
guishable from Ryan, stating: 
[W]e discern no principled distinction to be made be-
tween the case sub judice and that decided in 
Dewsnup.  The Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup is 
equally relevant and convincing in a case like ours 
where a debtor attempts to strip off, rather than merely 
strip down, an approved but unsecured lien.113 
 
107 Id. 
108 253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 2001). 
109 Id. at 779. 
110 Id. at 781. 
111 Id. at 782.  Specifically, the debtors argued that Nobelman prohibited lien stripping 
under § 1322 only when the claim was “secured by equity in a debtor’s principal residence.”  
Brief for Appellants at *11 Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 
2001) (No. 00-2137).  This argument is barely addressed by the court, however as noted by 
the creditors, it is clearly misguided, because § 1322 has no bearing on a Chapter 7 case; ra-
ther a Chapter 7 debtor needs to find a basis in § 506 to justify voiding any portion of the 
lien.  Brief for Appellee at *20-21 Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (No. 00-2137) (“Consequently, Nobelman does not stand for the proposition es-
poused by the Appellants that a Chapter 7 debtor merely has to show lack of equity to strip 
off a wholly unsecured lien against property, nor is it evidence of a judicial evolution in the 
interpretation of Section 506 as it applies to Chapter 7 bankruptcies.”). 
112 Ryan, 253 F.3d at 781-82. 
113 Id. at 782. 
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The court also noted two distinct rationales stated by the Dewsnup 
court which it believed to be equally applicable to debtors’ attempt to 
strip off the unsecured junior lien: (1) that the mortgagor and mortga-
gee bargained for the lien to remain with the real property until fore-
closure, and therefore “[a]ny increase over the judicially determined 
valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the cred-
itor,” and (2) absent clear Congressional intent to the contrary, it 
would not be proper to create such a “broad new remedy against al-
lowed claims to the extent that they become ‘unsecured,’ ” when tra-
ditionally, liens of this kind passed through bankruptcy unaffected.114 
The court was equally unimpressed by debtors’ attempt to use 
Nobelman to support their argument.115  As the court noted, 
Nobelman hinges on the interpretation of § 1322—a provision of the 
Code that was inapplicable to the Chapter 7 debtors before the court 
in Ryan.116  Therefore it was Dewsnup’s interpretation of § 506(d) 
that was relevant to Ryan.117  Accordingly, the court determined that 
Dewsnup was controlling; therefore, the Chapter 7 debtors were pro-
hibited from stripping off the wholly unsecured junior lien attached to 
their residence.118 
3. Sixth Circuit: Talbert v. City Mortgage 
Services (In re Talbert)119 
In Talbert, the debtors attempted to strip off a wholly unse-
cured junior lien attached to their residence during a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy proceeding.120  The debtors relied on similar arguments as 
those seen in Ryan and Laskin.121  Interestingly, in this case, the cred-
itors chose not to file an answer or other response in the bankruptcy 
court—the lower court raised the lien stripping issue sua sponte.122  
Continuing this strategy, the creditors also chose not to file an appel-
 
114 Id. (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992)). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Ryan, 253 F.3d at 782. 
118 Id. at 783. 
119 344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003). 
120 Id. at 556. 
121 Id. at 558. 
122 Id. at 556. 
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late brief when the case reached the Sixth Circuit.123  Nonetheless, the 
court found that Dewsnup prohibited the debtors’ attempt to strip off 
the unsecured junior lien for many of the same reasons as those artic-
ulated by the courts in Ryan and Laskin: (1) adherence to the “pre-
Code rule that real property liens emerge from bankruptcy unaffect-
ed;” (2) honoring the terms of the loan agreement by keeping the lien 
with the property until foreclosure; and (3) allowing any increase in 
the value of the property prior to the foreclosure sale to accrue to the 
benefit of the creditor in order to prevent the debtor from achieving a 
windfall.124 
4. Summary of Rationale for the Majority View 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth circuits have all followed rea-
soning similar to that seen in Dewsnup in order to create the majority 
view which prohibits the practice of stripping off during a Chapter 7 
proceeding.125  First, these courts looked for any indicator that Con-
gress intended to alter the longstanding practice of allowing real 
property liens to pass through bankruptcy unaffected.126  These courts 
concluded that Congress did not intend to alter this longstanding rule, 
as there was no clear language indicating otherwise.127  This conclu-
sion is supported by a broader principle, also noted in Dewsnup, that 
bankruptcy serves to give the honest debtor a fresh start by destroy-
ing in personam claims against the debtor, while leaving in rem 
 
123 Id. at 557 (“First, we must determine what consequences, if any, City Mortgage faces 
for not filing a brief in this appeal.  Although not a situation we confront often, on a previous 
occasion, we have addressed the effects of this unhelpful and highly risky form of appellate 
advocacy . . . .”) 
124 Talbert, 344 F.3d at 560-61 (“The Supreme Court’s reasoning for not permitting ‘strip 
downs’ in the Chapter 7 context applies with equal validity to a debtor’s attempt to effectu-
ate a Chapter 7 ‘strip off.’ ”). 
125 Id. at 556 (“Because the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . applies with equal 
force and logic to the issue at hand, we hold that a Chapter 7 debtor may not use § 506 to 
‘strip off’ an allowed junior lien . . . .”); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 
779 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Because we find that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup . . . is 
equally applicable to ‘strip offs’ as to ‘strip downs’, [sic] we hold that a debtor may not strip 
off an unsecured but allowed lien . . . .”); Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of Keystone (In re 
Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 875 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that Dewsnup neverthe-
less bars the relief debtors seek.”). 
126 E.g., Ryan, 253 F.3d at 782 (quoting Dewsnup for the proposition that Congress did 
not intend to alter the pre-Code rule allowing real property liens to pass through bankruptcy 
unaffected). 
127 E.g., id. 
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claims against the same debtor intact.128  Second, these courts looked 
to contract law for support, reasoning that at the time the mortgage 
contract was created, both the creditor and the debtor bargained for 
the lien to remain with the property until foreclosure.129  These courts 
refrained from altering this agreement because these terms were what 
the parties bargained for when they  entered into their agreement.130  
Third, these courts expressed a policy concern about the potential for 
an unfair outcome if the value of the property were to increase fol-
lowing the bankruptcy discharge.131  These courts reasoned that any 
increase in the value of the property should accrue to the benefit of 
the creditor in order to avoid a windfall to the debtor.132  This result 
could not be achieved if the debtor were allowed to strip off the lien 
during the bankruptcy proceeding.133 
B. Minority View: Strip Off is Allowed 
In the years immediately following Dewsnup, a number of 
district courts and bankruptcy courts had adopted the view that 
Dewsnup applied only when the debtor attempted to strip down an 
undersecured mortgage.134  In this view, Dewsnup did not prevent a 
debtor from striping off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.135  In-
 
128 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992) (discussing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 
501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991)). 
129 E.g., Talbert, 344 F.3d at 561 (“Also, as in the case of a ‘strip down,’ a ‘strip off’ 
would rob the mortgagee of the bargain it struck with the mortgagor, i.e., that the consensual 
lien would remain with the property until foreclosure.”). 
130 E.g., id. 
131 E.g., id. (“Finally, as was true in the context of ‘strip downs,’ Chapter 7 ‘strip offs’ al-
so carry the risk of a ‘windfall’ to the debtors should the value of the encumbered property 
increase by the time of the foreclosure sale.”). 
132 E.g., id. 
133 E.g., id. 
134 Warthen v. Smith (In re Smith), 1 F. App'x 178, 181 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished 
opinion); Yi v. Citibank (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 397 (E.D. Va. 1998); Smoot v. Wachovia 
Mortg. (In re Smoot), 465 B.R. 730, 733 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom., Wachovia 
Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Lavelle, No. 09-72389-478, 2009 WL 
4043089 at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009); Farha v. First Am. Title Ins. (In re Farha), 
246 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); Zempel v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re 
Zempel), 244 B.R. 625, 629 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999); Howard v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 
U.S.A. (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644, 647 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (all finding that Dewsnup 
does not apply to a debtor’s attempt to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien). 
135 Smith, 1 F. App'x at 181; Yi, 219 B.R. at 399; Smoot, 465 B.R. at 736; Lavelle, 2009 
WL 4043089 at *6; Zempel, 244 B.R. at 630; Howard, 184 B.R. at 647 (all allowing Chapter 
7 debtor to strip off wholly unsecured junior lien). 
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terestingly, the split was so contested that even within the same bank-
ruptcy court in New York the judges had adopted varying views.136  
As the issue evolved, each court that had adopted the minority view 
was subsequently abrogated when a higher court in the jurisdiction 
adopted the majority view.137  However, in an unpublished opinion138 
the Eleventh Circuit recently became the first circuit court to adopt 
the minority view—specifically that § 506(d) allows a debtor to strip 
off a wholly unsecured junior lien during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding.139 
In the minority view, the paradox of the unlucky penny aris-
es—if, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the home is valued at one 
penny more than the amount of the primary mortgage, the junior 
mortgage passes through bankruptcy unaffected.140  On the other 
hand, if, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the home is valued at 
one penny less than the amount owed on the primary mortgage, the 
debtor can void the junior lien in its entirety.141  This view provides 
 
136 Compare, e.g., Howard, 184 B.R. 644 (opinion by Judge Eisenberg from bankruptcy 
court in the eastern district of New York allowing Chapter 7 debtor to strip off wholly unse-
cured junior lien), with e.g., Pomilio v. Mers (In re Pomilio), 425 B.R. 11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (opinion by Judge Grossman, also from bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of 
New York, prohibiting a Chapter 7 debtor from stripping off a wholly unsecured junior lien).  
The split in this courthouse was recently resolved in favor of the majority view.  See Wa-
chovia Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Dewsnup is appli-
cable and binding as to stripping off of wholly unsecured junior liens). 
137 For example, courts in Kentucky and Michigan had adopted the minority view, see 
Farha, 246 B.R. 547 and Zempel, 244 B.R. 625; however, these cases were abrogated when 
the Sixth Circuit adopted the majority view, Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 
344 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2003).  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit and a district court in Virginia 
initially adopted the minority view, see Smith, 1 F. App'x 178 and Yi, 219 B.R. 394, but were 
abrogated when the Fourth Circuit changed course and adopted the majority view, Ryan v. 
Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001).  A keen eye will note that 
all of the opinions adopting the minority view, cited supra note 134, were subsequently ab-
rogated by either Talbert, Ryan, or Smoot.  This means that at the time of this article, the mi-
nority view is only used within the Eleventh Circuit as a result of McNeal, discussed infra 
Part IV.B.1. 
138 “An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.  
Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persua-
sive authority.”  11TH CIR. R. 36-2. 
139 McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562, 564-65 (11th Cir. 
2012) (unpublished opinion). 
140 E.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (not allowing debtor to avoid any por-
tion of lien despite the fact that value of collateral was less than the amount of the secured 
creditor’s claim). 
141 E.g., McNeal, 477 F. App’x 562 (allowing debtor to avoid entire junior lien when pri-
mary lien exceeded value of property attached to both liens). 
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“a strong incentive for borrowers with wholly unsecured mortgages 
to file for chapter 7 [sic] [because] [t]hey will be able to remove these 
mortgages from their properties and discharge the underlying debt, an 
option that is not available elsewhere.”142 
1. Eleventh Circuit: McNeal v. GMAC 
Mortgage, LLC (In re McNeal)143 
In McNeal, the debtor voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy.144  At that time, her house was valued at $141,416 and was 
subject to two mortgages: (1) a primary mortgage of $176,413; and 
(2) a junior lien in the amount of $44,444.145  Thus, the value of the 
primary mortgage alone exceeded the fair market value of the house, 
leaving absolutely no collateral to secure the junior lien.146  Accord-
ingly, the debtor attempted to strip off the junior lien pursuant to § 
506 of the Code.147  The bankruptcy court and the district court de-
termined that Dewsnup prohibited all lien stripping pursuant to § 
506(d); therefore the debtor could not rely on this provision to strip 
off her wholly unsecured junior lien.148 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Dewsnup was 
not on point; therefore the lower courts were not free to depart from 
earlier circuit precedent clearly allowing a debtor strip off of an unse-
cured junior mortgage during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.149  
The court noted that “the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dewsnup 
seem[ed] to reject the plain language analysis” that formed the basis 
for the circuit’s earlier precedent, but nonetheless required the lower 
courts to follow its earlier plain text analysis because of the “im-
 
142 Bankruptcy: Eleventh Circuit Endorses “Strip Off” of Junior Liens, 42-NOV REAL 
EST. L. REP., at 6.  Indeed, debtors in the lower courts within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh 
Circuit have already started to benefit from the McNeal holding.  See, e.g., In re Bertan, No. 
11–27057, 2013 WL 216231 at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2013) (noting the wisdom of 
McNeal and thereby allowing a debtor to strip off an unsecured junior lien during Chapter 7 
proceeding). 
143 477 F. App’x 562. 
144 Id. at 563. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. (stating that the amount of the primary lien was approximately $175,000, while the 
value of the home was only approximately $140,000). 
147 Id. 
148 McNeal, 477 F. App’x at 563. 
149 Id. at 564-65. 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 3, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/15
2013] THE UNLUCKY PENNY 781 
 
portant difference between the holding in a case and the reasoning 
that supports that holding.”150  Following this logic, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed the decision of the bankruptcy and district courts, and 
allowed the debtor in McNeal to strip off her wholly unsecured junior 
lien.151 
It is interesting to note what McNeal did not hold.  It did not 
determine whether, in the wake of Dewsnup, it may be necessary to 
re-visit earlier precedent or whether the rationales underpinning 
Dewsnup provided sufficient justifications to overrule earlier prece-
dent.  McNeal merely held that Dewsnup was not on point; therefore 
the lower courts could not use McNeal to depart from contrary earlier 
circuit precedent.152  The court’s substantive reasons for allowing 
strip off are not restated in McNeal, but the court states that courts 
should continue to adhere to the prior precedent set by the Eleventh 
Circuit.153 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Pre-Dewsnup 
Precedent: Folendore v. U.S. Small Business 
Administration (In re Folendore)154 
In Folendore, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) 
had provided a loan to the debtors, which was secured by collateral in 
certain real and personal property belonging to the debtors.155  The 
SBA loan was subject to a Subordination Agreement, which gave 
priority to two other liens that were secured by the same property se-
curing the SBA loan.156  At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the val-
ue of the two priority liens exceeded the value of the collateral prop-
erty; therefore the SBA loan was not backed by any collateral value 
in the real property.157  Accordingly, the debtors sought to strip off 
the SBA lien pursuant to § 506(d).158  The court noted that the parties 
agreed “that the SBA [did] not have an allowed secured claim,” and 
 
150 Id. at 564. 
151 Id. at 564-65. 
152 Id. at 564. 
153 McNeal, 477 F. App’x at 564. 
154 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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that the plain text of 506(d) rendered this type of lien as void.159  
Therefore, the court expressly adopted the view that § 506(d) allowed 
the debtors to void the wholly unsecured junior lien because the plain 
text of § 506(d) voids any claim that is not both allowed and se-
cured.160 
3. Reconciling Folendore and Dewsnup 
Although the McNeal court declined to take the opportunity to 
reconcile the reasoning of Dewsnup with the reasoning supporting the 
precedent set by Folendore this is the next logical step in the analy-
sis.  In order to determine whether Dewsnup defeats the logic of 
Folendore, the Eleventh Circuit would likely look to the two factors 
that formed the basis for the Court’s holding in Dewsnup: (1) the 
plain text of the statute; and (2) legislative history.161  Dewnsnup ac-
tually provides significant support for Folendore’s plain text analysis 
because Dewsnup resolves the ambiguity in § 506(d) in favor of read-
ing the terms “allowed” and “secured” as two separate require-
ments.162  Applying Dewsnup’s interpretation of § 506(d), a claim 
that is not both allowed and secured can be voided using § 506(d)—a 
result that is consistent with Folendore’s plain text interpretation of § 
506(d).163 
 
159 Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1538. 
160 Id. at 1539. 
161 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 415, 417 (providing plain text interpretation of 
the term “allowed, secured claim” as used in § 506(d), and supporting this interpretation 
based on Congressional intent to not alter pre-Code treatment of real property liens). 
162 Id.  The Court states that “respondents’ alternative position, espoused also by the Unit-
ed States . . . generally is the better of the several approaches.”  Id. at 417.  The Court states 
the respondents’ alternative position, the position the Court ultimately adopts, to be as fol-
lows: 
In the alternative, respondents, joined by the United States as amicus cu-
riae, argue more broadly that the words “allowed secured claim” in § 
506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art by reference to § 
506(a), which by its terms is not a definitional provision.  Rather, the 
words should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, al-
lowed, and, second, secured. 
Id. at 415. 
163 Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1538 (voiding a lien when the claim is allowed but not se-
cured). 
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C. Which Viewpoint is Correct? 
The route by which the Eleventh Circuit creates the minority 
viewpoint, splits the issue into two subissues.  The first subissue is 
whether, procedurally speaking, lower courts may rely on Dewsnup 
to reverse circuit precedent with respect to stripping off.  The second 
subissue is whether, substantively speaking, § 506(d) allows a Chap-
ter 7 debtor to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien. 
1. Procedurally Speaking: Is Dewsnup on 
Point? 
At the current time, the minority view is only in existence 
within the Eleventh Circuit, and it is only because of the procedure-
based rationale stated in McNeal.164  The rationale of McNeal is only 
that Dewsnup is not on point; therefore, the lower courts are bound 
by Folendore.165  The Eleventh Circuit follows a prior panel prece-
dent rule which provides that “a prior panel’s holding is binding on 
all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to 
the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting 
en banc.”166  Therefore, even if the panel writing the McNeal opinion 
felt that the time was ripe to abrogate or overrule Folendore, the pan-
el was bound by principles of stare decisis.167  Without an en banc 
review, the panel simply could not depart from the earlier circuit 
precedent unless Dewsnup sufficiently undermined the earlier circuit 
precedent set by Folendore.168 
Looking carefully at the precise holding of Dewsnup, it be-
comes clear that the Eleventh Circuit was correct in observing that 
the Dewsnup holding was not entirely on point with respect to the 
strip off line of cases.  The lien at issue in Dewsnup was secured by 
some collateral; therefore, the Court spoke only as to the inability to 
 
164 See supra notes 134-137 (indicating the abrogation of the minority view in all but the 
Eleventh Circuit); McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re McNeal), 477 F. App’x 562 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (adopting the minority view in the Eleventh Circuit). 
165 McNeal, 477 F. App’x at 564. 
166 United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). 
167 See id. (acknowledging the strength of the Eleventh Circuit’s prior precedent rule). 
168 See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Under our 
prior precedent rule, a panel cannot overrule a prior one’s holding even though it is con-
vinced it is wrong.”). 
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void a claim that is both allowed and secured.169  On the other hand, 
the strip off cases are entirely distinguishable due to the fact that the-
se cases deal with liens that are wholly unsecured.170  The plain text 
interpretation used by the Court in Dewsnup indicates that § 506(d) 
speaks only of claims that are not both allowed and secured, but con-
tains no mention of treatment of unsecured liens under § 506(d).171  
Therefore, Dewsnup’s holding that § 506(d) cannot void a lien that is 
both allowed and at least partially secured, does not speak directly to 
the case where the lien is allowed but unsecured.  This, coupled with 
the statement of the Dewsnup court expressly narrowing its holding 
to the specific facts of Dewsnup, supports the Eleventh Circuit’s 
viewpoint that Dewsnup should not be blindly applied as binding 
precedent to the strip off line of cases.172 
This observation is significant due to the fact that there are 
currently lower courts within seven different circuit jurisdictions, 
where the circuit court has remained silent on the issue, but the lower 
courts have applied Dewsnup as controlling precedent in order to 
hold that a debtor may not use § 506(d) to strip off a wholly unse-
cured junior lien during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.173  Six of 
these circuits follow rules similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s prior prec-
edent rule, meaning that prior panel precedent can only be reversed 
by an intervening Supreme Court decision that is on point, or by an 
 
169 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (“Therefore, we hold that § 506(d) does 
not allow petitioner to ‘strip down’ respondents’ lien, because respondents’ claim is secured 
by a lien . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
170 E.g., In re Bertan, No. 11–27057, 2013 WL 216231 at *1, *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 
2013) (allowing strip off of junior lien when there was “no equity securing the Creditor’s 
obligation . . . .”). 
171 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. 
172 Id. at 416-17 (“We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to 
await their legal resolution on another day.”). 
173 See, e.g., Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot (In re Smoot), 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(district court within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit relying on Dewsnup); Richins v. 
Bank of Am. Home Loans (In re Richins), 469 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012) (bankruptcy 
court within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit relying on Dewsnup); In re Immel, 436 B.R. 
538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (bankruptcy court in the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit rely-
ing on Dewsnup); Janssen v. Citifinancial Servs. (In re Janssen), 311 B.R. 518 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 2004) (bankruptcy court within the jurisdiction of the Eight Circuit relying on 
Dewsnup); Bowman v. Ocwen Fed. Bank (In re Bowman), 304 B.R. 166 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 
2003) (bankruptcy court within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit relying on Dewsnup); In 
re Virello, 236 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999) (bankruptcy court within the D.C. Circuit re-
lying on Dewsnup); In re Madjerac, 157 B.R. 499 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993) (bankruptcy court 
within jurisdiction of First Circuit relying on Dewsnup). 
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en banc review.174  This means that the reasoning of these lower 
courts was not procedurally sound, particularly if the holding was in-
consistent with pre-Dewsnup circuit precedent.  These lower court 
decisions applying Dewsnup to stripping off may be easily reversed 
at the appellate level, particularly if the circuit courts were to find 
that prior precedent within the circuit would require a different result. 
2. Substantively Speaking: Can a Debtor Use § 
506(d) to Strip Off a Junior Lien? 
The minority view is not only the better view as a matter of 
procedure, it is also the better view in terms of substance.  The major-
ity view is based heavily on concerns other than the plain text of the 
statute; it reaches the conclusion that Dewsnup bans both stripping 
off an stripping down by extrapolating the policy and historical con-
cerns surrounding stripping down and assuming that those same con-
cerns apply equally to stripping off.175  In Dewsnup, the Court only 
turned to related policy, such as the historical treatment of similar 
liens, in order to resolve the ambiguity in the text of § 506(d).176  The 
Court stated that these considerations would not have been control-
ling but for the ambiguity in the statutory text.177 
As a result of Dewsnup, the text of § 506(d) is now unambig-
uously interpreted in a manner that requires courts to read the phrase 
“allowed secured claim” term-by-term, to refer to a claim that is both 
allowed and secured.178  In Dewsnup, the Court stated that the factors 
 
174 Adams v. Zarnel (In re Zarnel), 619 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (“This panel is 
‘bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en 
banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.’ ” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2008) (“However, ‘[i]t is a cardinal rule in our cir-
cuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.’ ” (alteration in original) (cita-
tion omitted)); United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Only the Su-
preme Court or an en banc court can overturn prior panel precedent in ordinary 
circumstances . . . .”); Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460, 
464 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The court is bound by its precedent absent en banc review.”); In re 
Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We are bound by the precedent of prior panels 
absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.”); 
O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A] panel of this court 
cannot overrule a prior panel precedent.”). 
175 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
176 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20. 
177 Id. (“Of course, where the language is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history 
cannot be controlling.”). 
178 Id. at 415, 417. 
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it found controlling would not have been controlling if the statute 
were not ambiguous.179  The statute is no longer ambiguous by virtue 
of Dewsnup’s interpretation; therefore courts are wrong to consider 
the Dewsnup factors rather than the clear and unambiguous text of 
the statute in applying § 506(d) to stripping off. 
As Justice Douglas once stated, “[The courts] do not sit as su-
per-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws 
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social condi-
tions.”180  Therefore, it is not enough that policy would support read-
ing the statute in a manner different than Congress intended, for it is 
Congress who has the Constitutional authority to stipulate, through 
the process of legislation, the precise nature of the rights and obliga-
tions of a creditor and debtor throughout the bankruptcy process.181  
Accordingly, in addressing which interpretation is correct, the courts 
must suppress the desire to pick an interpretation based on its wis-
dom, but rather must adhere to the law as unambiguously expressed 
by Congress. 
Bearing this in mind, the plain text interpretation of the 
Folendore court,182 read in conjunction with the plain text interpreta-
tion of the Dewsnup court,183 favors the notion that the plain text of 
the statute expressly allows a debtor to strip off an unsecured junior 
mortgage.  As the Dewsnup court noted, the term “allowed secured 
lien” as utilized in § 506(d) is not a term of art defined by § 506(a), 
but rather is reference to a claim that is both allowed and secured.184  
Section 506(d) states, “To the extent that a lien secures a claim 
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such a lien is 
void . . . .”185  In the stripping off line of cases, there is no question 
that the creditor’s claim is not secured.186  By the plain text of § 
506(d), the creditor’s claim is not both allowed and secured; therefore 
 
179 Id. at 419-20. 
180 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the authority to establish Bankruptcy 
laws). 
182 Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th 
Cir. 1989). 
183 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415, 417. 
184 Id. 
185 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2006). 
186 E.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The 
parties agree that the second deed of trust is a fully allowed claim, but wholly unsecured as 
to the property.”). 
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the associated lien is void.187  Given the role of the court as an inter-
preter of the law, rather than a maker of the law, all of the important 
policy concerns leading to the majority view are simply not enough 
to overcome the plain text of the statute, which becomes wholly un-
ambiguous as a result of the Dewsnup Court’s reading of the terms 
“allowed secured claim” as used in § 506(d). 
Additionally, the minority view does not frustrate the legisla-
tive intent embraced by the Dewsnup court.  The Dewsnup court con-
strued the statute in a manner favorable to maintaining consistency 
with prior treatment of debts of the kind at issue in order to resolve 
the ambiguous legislative text.188  The Dewsnup court determined 
that, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, Congress did not 
intend to alter the well-entrenched principle of bankruptcy law that 
debts secured by interests in real property should pass through bank-
ruptcy unaffected.189  However, while it is true that claims that were 
at least partially secured by collateral in real property have historical-
ly passed through bankruptcy unaffected, the question remains as to 
whether the same can be said for claims that were not secured by any 
collateral value in real property at the time of bankruptcy filing.  Both 
of the cases relied on by the Dewsnup court in embracing the exist-
ence of the pre-Code allowance of real property liens to pass through 
bankruptcy unaffected either specifically acknowledged a distinction 
between a secured and unsecured creditors, or preserved the lien 
based on outdated requirements of the Code that are not applicable 
today.190  Furthermore, the foundation of this viewpoint can be found 
within the creditors’ appellate brief, which advocated for the majority 
view banning stripping down, but nonetheless limited its discussion 
to secured claims.191 
 
187 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). 
188 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. 
189 Id. 
190 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935) (“It is true 
that the position of a secured creditor, who has rights in specific property, differs fundamen-
tally from that of an unsecured creditor, who has none . . . .”); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 
617, 620-21 (1886) (allowing creditor’s lien on real property to survive bankruptcy dis-
charge because the creditor did not prove his debt or release the lien). 
191 Brief for Respondent at *27 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741) 
(“[The Bankruptcy Code] recognized the right of a secured creditor to pay itself from its se-
curity . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Id. at *27-28 (“Thus, Section 57(h) per-
mitted a secured creditor to participate in the distribution of the estate . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)); Id. at *28 (“The 1898 Act contained no express provisions relating to . . . the effect of 
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Finally, a careful reading of the legislative history indicates 
Congressional desire to treat secured claims differently than unse-
cured claims.  The House Report states, in relevant part: 
One of the more significant changes from current law 
in proposed Title 11 is the treatment of secured credi-
tors and secured claims.  Unlike current law, H.R. 
8200 distinguishes between secured and unsecured 
claims, rather than between secured and unsecured 
creditors.  The distinction becomes important in the 
handling of creditors with a lien on property that is 
worth less than the amount of their claim, that is, those 
creditors that are undersecured.  Current law is ambig-
uous and vague, especially under Chapter XIII, on 
whether an undersecured creditor is to be treated as a 
secured creditor, or as a partially secured and partially 
unsecured creditor.  By addressing the problem in 
terms of claims, the bill makes clear that an unsecured 
creditor is to be treated as having a secured claim to 
the extent of the value of the collateral, and an unse-
cured claim for the balance of his claim against the 
debtor.192 
This portion of the House Report clearly acknowledges that secured 
claims are to be treated differently than unsecured claims.  This 
would seem to indicate that, regardless of the pre-Code rule as to real 
property liens in general, in the post-Code world, Congress intended 
unsecured claims to be treated differently than fully or partially se-
cured claims. 
V. STRIPPING OFF AND CHAPTER 13 
For the purpose of analyzing the proper treatment of a lien 
that is less than fully secured during bankruptcy, the fundamental dif-
ference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is the impact of § 1322.193  
 
the bankruptcy case on the lien of a secured creditor.” (alteration in original) (emphasis add-
ed) (citation omitted)). 
192 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 180-81 (1977). 
193 Compare, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (analyzing whether 
§ 1322(b)(2) allowed a Chapter 13 debtor to strip down a lien), with, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 
U.S. 410 (analyzing whether § 506 allowed a Chapter 7 debtor to strip down a lien, without 
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A Chapter 13 debtor can rely on § 1322—a provision of the Code 
that is unavailable to a Chapter 7 debtor—in order to modify some of 
his obligations towards certain creditors.194  Section 1322(b)(2) sets 
out a general rule allowing the debtor to “modify the rights of holders 
of secured claims.”195  The statute then immediately creates an excep-
tion to the general rule (often referred to as the “antimodification ex-
ception”) which disallows modification of a “claim [that is] secured 
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s princi-
pal residence . . . .”196  Therefore, § 1322 allows a debtor to modify 
the rights of a holder of a secured claim, unless the claim is secured 
by an interest in the debtor’s principle residence.197 
Accordingly, the legal issue central to the question of strip-
ping off and Chapter 13 is whether the claim relating to the unsecured 
junior lien is subject to modification under § 1322(b)(2), or whether it 
is protected by the antimodification exception.198  Put simply, the 
question is whether the junior lien is secured by an interest in the 
debtor’s principal residence.  If the junior lien is not secured by an in-
terest in the debtor’s principal residence then the general rule set out 
in § 1322(b)(2) allows the debtor to strip off the lien. 
A. Majority View: § 1322 Allows a Debtor to Strip Off 
an Unsecured Junior Mortgage 
The overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that a 
debtor can use § 1322(b)(2) to strip off a wholly unsecured junior 
lien.199  These courts view the junior lien as falling within § 
 
mention to § 1322(b)(2)). 




198 See, e.g., Lane v. Western Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 
2002) (determining whether a debtor could modify “the rights of a totally unsecured home-
stead mortgagee” by using § 1322(b)(2)). 
199 E.g., First Mariner Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 407 F. App’x 713, 713 (4th Cir. 
2011) (unpublished per curiam opinion); Lane, 280 F.3d at 665; Zimmer v. PSB Lending 
Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty 
(In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 2001); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Assoc. 
(In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Dickerson (In re 
Dickerson), 222 F.3d 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re 
McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 608 (3d Cir. 2000); Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 
187 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 832 
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1322(b)(2)’s general rule allowing modification; not within the 
antimodification exception for liens secured by a debtor’s primary 
residence.200  These courts reconcile this viewpoint with Nobelman 
by reasoning that Nobelman protects only the rights of creditors who 
are first deemed to have a secured debt within the meaning of § 
506(a).201  The debt is secured if the creditor’s “interest in the collat-
eral has economic value.”202  A creditor’s lien on the debtor’s real 
property has no economic value if there is a primary lien on the same 
property which exceeds the value of the property.203  Accordingly, a 
wholly unsecured junior lien is unsecured within the meaning of § 
506(a) (although it is “secured by a lien on the debtor’s principal res-
idence”) because the junior lien has no economic value; therefore the 
debtor is free to modify the loan as he could any other unsecured 
debt.204 
Interestingly, as a procedural matter, courts that adopt the ma-
jority view are inherently acknowledging that stripping off is not pre-
cisely analogous to stripping down.  If it were true that stripping off 
and stripping down were the same, then the lower courts would not 
be allowed to deviate from the Court’s precedent stated in Nobelman.  
Although the courts do not expressly discuss this, by adopting the 
view that a Chapter 13 debtor can strip off a wholly unsecured junior 
lien, these courts are inherently stating that Nobelman’s precedent 
prohibiting strip down does not act as precedent to prohibit strip off. 
 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (all allowing Chapter 13 debtor to strip off wholly unsecured junior 
lien). 
200 See cases cited supra note 199. 
201 E.g., Lane, 280 F.3d at 667 (“But the majority of courts . . . have declined to read 
Nobelman as placing such [unsecured] lienholders in the class of claimants whose rights are 
entitled to special protection under the antimodification clause of § 1322(b)(2).”). 
202 Id. at 664; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006) (defining secured claim). 
203 See, e.g., Zimmer, 313 F.3d at 1221-22 (describing a junior lien as unsecured when the 
primary lien attached to the same property exceeded the value of the property). 
204 First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221, 224-25 (D. Md. 2009) (“Without first 
demonstrating that it has an allowed secured claim, a creditor cannot invoke the 
antimodification protection in § 1322(b)(2).”), aff’d sub nom, Johnson, 407 F. App’x at 713 
(“Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.”) (unpublished per curi-
um opinion). 
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B. Minority View: Nobelman is Controlling; 
Therefore a Debtor May not Strip Off an 
Unsecured Junior Mortgage 
So far, only one lower court has adopted the view that 
Nobelman prohibits not only stripping down pursuant to § 1322, but 
also stripping off.205  To support this view, the court points to the fact 
that Nobelman stood for the protection of the rights of the creditor, 
and that these rights are equally entitled to protection in the case of 
an undersecured primary mortgage as they are in the case of a com-
pletely unsecured junior mortgage.206  The court reasoned that 
Nobelman protects the rights of a creditor whose debt is secured by a 
lien on the debtor’s primary residence, regardless of the amount, if 
any, of the “equity protecting the secured creditors.”207  The court 
concluded that based on the language of § 1322(b)(2) and the 
Nobelman opinion, there was no reason to treat unsecured junior liens 
differently than partially secured primary mortgages.208 
C. Which Viewpoint is Correct? 
The correct view is that of the overwhelming majority of 
courts—that is, stripping off pursuant to § 1322(b) is fully allowable, 
because a lien without any equity, even if on the debtor’s primary 
residence, does not fall within the antimodification exception of § 
1322(b)(2).209  This view focuses heavily on the plain text definition 
 
205 Barnes v. Am. Gen. Fin. (In re Barnes), 207 B.R. 588, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(“The Debtors’ attempt to strip off the Creditor’s security interest in the Debtors’ principal 
residence finds no support in either § 1322(b)(2) or Nobelman.”).  Additionally, at least two 
cases exist where a court has disallowed a strip off in a Chapter 13 proceeding; however, 
these cases were based on procedural or substantive matters that did not address the issue of 
whether § 1322(b)(2) allowed the modification of the lien.  Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re 
Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1279 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that Chapter 13 debtor could not 
strip off junior lien pursuant to § 506(d), but acknowledging result may have been different 
had debtors’ asked for strip off pursuant to § 1322(b)(2)); In re Thompson, No. 10-00530, 
2010 WL 3719943 at *1 (Bankr. D.C. Sept. 17, 2010) (dismissing motion to strip off for 
failure to file as adversary claim). 
206 Barnes, 207 B.R. at 592 (discussing with approval the view that “the proper reading of 
[Nobelman] was an endorsement of creditor rights, where ‘rights’ were defined by state law 
and the underlying contract.”). 
207 Id. at 593. 
208 Id. 
209 E.g., Lane v. Western Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
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of “secured” as set forth in § 506(a) of the Code.210  The minority 
view, on the other hand, attempts to embrace the policy behind 
Nobelman and expand that policy to reach the similar situation of 
stripping off of junior liens.211  However, courts should not allow pol-
icy to negate the plain text of the statute because Congress has the au-
thority to legislate, even if unwisely, provided that the legislation re-
mains within Constitutional bounds.212  The plain text of § 1322(b)(2) 
allows modification of secured claims, other than those claims that 
are “secured only by a security interest in . . . the debtor’s principal 
residence.”213  Section 506(a) clearly indicates that a junior mortgage 
lacking in any equity is not a secured claim;214 therefore, by the plain 
text of these two sections, Congress did not intend to protect this type 
of claim from modification as part of a Chapter 13 plan. 
Additionally, recall that Justice Stevens noted that Congress 
likely created the antimodification exception in order to encourage 
lending in the home market.215  However, it does not necessarily fol-
low that Congress would have wanted to entice creditors into offering 
higher risk second mortgages.  The recent financial crisis, which was 
precipitated, in part, by the collapse of the subprime mortgage mar-
ket,216 highlights the fact that not all lending in the home market is 
equal; therefore Stevens’s observation about Congressional intent for 
creating the antimodification exception should not be extrapolated to 
mean that Congress intended to encourage banks to give high-risk 
loans secured by little, if any, collateral in the debtor’s home. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The comparison between the two majority viewpoints, that 
strip off is not allowed pursuant to § 506(d) in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
but is allowed pursuant to § 1322(b) in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, is rid-
 
210 See supra notes 199-204, and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 205-208, and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 180-181, and accompanying text. 
213 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010). 
214 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). 
215 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
216 Robin Harding & Claire Jones, Fed Red-Faced as Notes Reveal Officials Failed to 
Grasp Dangers of 2007 Crisis, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, at 1, available at GALE, 
Doc. No. GALE|A315424351 (stating that the crisis occurred “on the back of problems in 
the market for subprime mortgage loans . . . .”). 
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dled with contradictions and inconsistences.  First, as a matter of pro-
cedure, courts treat Dewsnup as binding with respect to stripping off, 
while failing to treat Nobelman as binding with respect to stripping 
off.  The majority view with respect to Chapter 7 is premised on the 
notion that Court’s prohibition on stripping down is precisely on 
point to the similar situation of stripping off; therefore Dewsnup pro-
hibits both stripping down and stripping off in Chapter 7 proceed-
ings.217  Conversely, the majority view with respect to Chapter 13 is 
premised on the notion that the Court’s prohibition on stripping down 
is not precisely on point to the similar situation of stripping off; there-
fore Nobelman prevents only stripping down of junior mortgages 
while leaving open the question of stripping off.218 
Furthermore, as a matter of substance, the two majority view-
points treat the Code’s definition of “secured” in a conflicting fash-
ion.  The majority view in Chapter 13 carefully reads the plain text of 
§ 506(a) to mean a junior lien with no economic value is to be treated 
as unsecured for the purposes of § 1322(b).219  Conversely, the major-
ity view in Chapter 7 carefully reads the plain text of § 506(a) to in-
dicate that a junior lien with no economic value should be treated as a 
claim that is secured for the purposes of § 506(d).220 
In order to reconcile these procedural and substantive con-
flicts, courts should focus first and foremost on the plain text of the 
Code, as interpreted by Dewsnup and Nobelman.  This analysis 
would lead to the conclusion that a junior lien that is secured by col-
lateral lacking in any economic value is unsecured within the mean-
ing of § 506(a).  Following this, the plain text of § 506(d), as inter-
preted by Dewsnup, allows the debtor to void a lien that is not both 
allowed and secured.  Similarly, the unsecured lien is not a debt se-
cured by collateral in the debtor’s primary residence; therefore this 
lien can be modified by the debtor as part of a Chapter 13 plan.  Alt-
hough certain policy implications certainly support the other view-
points adopted by the courts, the courts are interpreters, rather than 
creators, of law.  As such, courts should adhere to the plain text of the 
statute set forth by Congress as the first step in interpreting these 
complex areas of Code.  Therefore, the proper viewpoint is that strip-
 
217 See supra Part IV.A. 
218 See supra Part V.A. 
219 See supra Part V.A. 
220 See supra Part IV.A. 
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ping off should be allowed, both in Chapter 7 and in Chapter 13 pro-
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